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ONE 
WoRKING 
ON ONESELF 
A book is a mirror; if an ape gazes into it, of course no apostle 
looks back out. 
- Lichtenberg 
Working in . is really more a working on oneself 
- Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 
There is an oddness to Wittgenstein's corpus that derives from its 
history. For many years the bulk .9f its unsorted stac..ksJay in a steamer trunk 
unde r G. E. M. Anscom be's bed- These stacks are indicative of Wittgen-
stein 's perfectionist and labor-intensive editing process (a process which pre-
ven ted him from publishing anything in his life time after the Tractatus ); 
th ey render apt the book titl e "Zettel" (th e German word for "sc rap of 
paper") 1 and deprive his later works of any sense of finality -a trait symp-
tomatic of all his posthumously published writings. The closest thing to a 
"fini shed" manuscript afte r 1929 appears to have no more structure than a 
se ri e of numbered paragraphs. This oddness can tempt us to think of 
Wittgenstein 's late r writings as no thing more than an aggrega te of stand-
alone aphorism s. 2 T he ca refree stance we are often guilty of taking toward 
hisw~hat 
any rem ark by his hand m erits equal attention for the light it throws on 
his philosophy; as if his genius were a natural phenomenon which 
11 
---------
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could not fa il to express itself with equal power in all its manifes tations. 
Thi s attitude, however, makes one neglectful ofWittgcnstein 's own in-
tentions, of the fac t that he was ac tively striving to develop his thought 
in certain di rections, as is made evident by the continual revising and 
reordering to whi ch he subj ected his remarks.3 
With th ese words, Lars I lertzberg advises us to be alert to marks of on-
going development in Wittgcnstein 's thinking as we read th e later corpus. 
1 suggest that any development in Wittgenstcin's later th ought cannot be 
fully appreciated if his later works are read in isolation from the high point 
of his early period , th e Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. G ranted, Wit:tgen-
stcin 's later th ought constituted a revolution aga inst the received philo-
sophical paradigm of th e ea rl y twenti eth century. However, the nature of 
this revolution is widely disputed. I maintain that Wittgenstcin's revolution 
<
is best told as th e story of character transformation and conceptual meta-
morphosis that a~unes one kind of mi. ty between Wittgenstein 's ea rl y and_ 
late works. 
The suggestion of uni ty between the "early" and "later" Wittgcnstcin 
is certainly not new. There is enough ambigui ty in Wittgenstein 's writings 
fo r nea rly any philosophical pos ition to find a resting place . Ye t many who 
argue for a unity do so either by conceiving it in terms of a conceptual con-
tinuity (as if al l th e later works could be distilled into th eses that oppose 
the earlier Tractatus on a common ground ) or by trying to ass imilate both 
periods in his thinking under a di fferent rubric altogeth er. For exampl e, 
soon after its publicati on, th e Tractatus wa hail ed as the fin al pi ece in 
the logical positivist's jigsaw puzzle. Less famously, Bernard Williams and 
Norman Malcolm debate the lingering effect of Kantian idealism on Witt-
genstein 's writing.4 But there is something ve ry~ittgen s teinian about 
all such projects. 
Unfortunately, when we look for continuity in Wittgenstein's work we 
are tempted to lo_gk for a theoretical continuity. T hus Williams sees a latent 
idealism, Malcolm hedges toward realism, James C. Edwards sees Wittgcn-
stein 's progressive emancipation from "rationali ty-as-representation ," Fer-
gus Kerr locates Wittgenstein 's work in reaction to th e myth of th e solitary 
wordless Cartes ian ego, and so on. 5 But can any author cla im to have un-
covered what Wittgenstein is really up to by framing the putative "theory" 
~ying undernea th hi~ writing~? : suspect that each ".discovery" of a supposed central fea ture of W1ttgcnstcm s thought has the gnp 1t does on each author not because he or she has an objec tive grasp on Wittgensteinian truths, but because Wittgenstein has a subjec tive grasp on them as readers; each "dis-
J 
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covcry" is but a manifestation of t·heir parti cular "cure." Reading Wittgen-
stein rightly leads to di ve rse convictions because maladies differ; eac h au-
thor champions th e "Wittgensteini an th eory" that most reAec ts the way 
that he or she has escaped his or her own Ay-bottlc. Wittgenstein cannot 
be subsum ed without remainder und er any theoretical framework be-
cause, as we shall sec, the uni ty his work displays is a narrative rather than 
a theoretical one. 
Rush Rh ces is said to have once rema rked that th e chi ef work of 
Wittgenstein 's later period, th e PhilosofJhicallnvestigations, has the unity 
of a conversa ti on. Ordinaril y, it would not dawn on us to treat a conversa-
tion as an exercise in propositional logic. ("Yes, I see that your decision to 
se t the orthodontist appointment for Tuesday follows from your claim that 
blue is your favorite color and that Siberia may still have snow on th e 
ground.") If asked to "outline" a conve rsa ti on we would be hard pressed 
to know what to do. Typically, conversa tions cannot be reduced to their 
"essence" without great loss nor can they be fully "explain ed" apart from 
simply repeating all the words of th e dialogue. We can't even imagine that { 
the ~opics tou che~] on betray a thematic unity that might be thought to un- ~ 
derhe a conversatiOn. Rather, conversa t1ons are woven from a cornucop1a 
of topi cs by speakers who detect ways in which each sentence has bea ring 
upon th e others. The only thing that guarantees the continuation of a con-
versa tion is th e skill of th e interlocutors to go on. 
This metaphor ap tl y describes the unity of the entire Wittgensteinian 
corpus. The I inguisti c (or narrative) unity of his philosophy is an express ion 
of Wittgenstein's own ability to "go on."]:.h~ unresolved tensions in the 
Tractatus foreshadow th e direction of hi'Sconccptual development. For the 
remainder of this chapter I will show that his conceptual transformation in-
volved the migration of th e human subject to the ve ry center of his atten-
tion. Wittgcnstein's revolution in philosophy was not simply that he had 
succeeded in changing th e topi cs of philosophy but that he sought to 
change its subj ects. As Wittgenstein's outlook matured, it became more in-
- tcntionally ethical-not in the sense of providing an ethical theory, but in 
the sense fh;;t'hc as philosopher functioned as a moral sage whose therapy 
ass isted the character transformation of concrete human selves.6 
--.:..;: ---- - . 
MIGRATION OF THE SUBJECT 
One of th e ways Wittgenstein mystifies contemporary thinkers is th at he de-
fi es class ification within the theoretical space mapped out by Enlightenment 
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thinkers. Whereas criti cal thinking seeks obj ectivity in knowledge, Wiltgen-
} stein's postcritical philosophy came to be preoccupied with the unavoidably 
1 messy way that particular human subj ects are entangled with acts of know-
ing. Wiltgens tein 's conceptual journey along these lines was fo reshadowed 
by tensions in the content, style, and "storyline" of the Tractatus. These ten-
sions resulted in Wittgenstein 's experimentati on with pedagogy and ulti-
mately precipitated a clea r th erapeuti c meth od in philosophy. But th e 
direc tion that his later philosophy was to take seems very difficult to envi-
sion, given the way the Tractatus trea ts human selves as virtually invisible. 
The Invisible Self 
Th ere is some ambiguity in speaking of th e "migrati on of th e subj ec t" in 
Wittgenstein 's ea rly works, sin ce th e Tractatus referred to human subjec ts 
in two distinct ways. On the one hand, there is the "psychological I," which 
is the human being, th e human body, the human soul with all its psyc ho-
logical attributes. 7 This "I" is th e hu ma n self whose identity is bound up 
with th e history of a parti cular communi ty. One outspoken Wiltgenstein-
ian commentator, D. Z. Phillips, explains, "As D.Z.P. I am one of a human 
neighborhood . I am given a name by my neighbors. I cannot ask, 'What is 
~ hi story to me?' My identity is my biography. It is one biography among 
many."8 However, at anoth er level, th e fact that a person can call th e world 
"my world" (as in TLP 5.62) leads many to assume th ere must be a meta-
physical subj ect doing the possessing, a subj ect to whom th e "my" refers. 
This is what Wittgenstein call ed, on the other hand, the "phil osophical I": 
5.641 The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or 
the human soul of whi ch psychology trea ts, but the metaphys i-
cal subj ec t. . . . 
In contrast to th e psychological "I," the "phil osophical I" has no char-
acter, no history, and no nttighbors. Wittgcnstein explained that th e meta-
phys ical subj ect is as elusive as mercury squeezed between one's fingers. 
5.631 Ifl wrote a book "The world as I found it," I should also have 
th erein to report on my body and say whi ch members obey my 
will and which do not, etc. This th en would be a method of iso-
lating th e subj ec t or rath er of showing th at in an important 
sense there is no subj ect: that is to say, of it alone in thi s book 
menti on could not be made. 
I! li 
II 
-- --
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5.632 T he sub ject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of 
the world. 
5.633 Where in the word is a metaphysical subj ect to be noted? 
As Phillips correctly points out, the metaphysical subject cannot be a part 
of the world of experience, as th e psychological "I" can be, because it is 
the putative subj ect of all experience. Even the "mineness" of experience 
is itself an experi ence. Therefore, this subj ect necessarily li es outside the 
world of experience; or better, "it is a limi t of th e world." Whereas th e psy-
chological I is irrelevant to philosophy, th e philosophical I appears to be in-
~-ibl e to philosophical scrutiny. 
The Tractarian presumption concerning the invisibility of the subject 
may be seen in the shocking transition seen from statements 5.641 to 6 
(Routledge edition): 
5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we 
can ta lk of a non-psychological!. 
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that th e "world 
is my world". 
The philosophical I is not th e man, not the human body or 
the human soul of wh ich psychology treats, but the metaphysi-
cal sub ject, the limit- not part of the world. 
6 The general form of truth-function is: [ ,J, s, N(s)J. 
This is th e general form of a proposition. 
In one fell swoop, Wittgenstein jumped from the nature of th e selfto sym-
bolic logic. How could Wittgenstein tolerate this abrupt change of topics 
in an otherwise predictably syllogistic argument? Does this constitute a 
breakdown in th e argument? I th ink Wittgenstein does proceed reasonably. 
If th e metaphysical subj ec t is simply an cxtensionless point coord in ated 
with th e world, th en it is not worth troubling over; it simply drops out of 
view. Wittgenste in wanted to discard th e subject altogether and even pro-~ 
posed that language dispense with the word "!."9 In statement 6 Wittgen-
stein was simply ga th ering threads from his earli er di sc ussion about th e 
world and the logical form that makes talking about it possible.10 Discus-
sion about the philosophi cal self and "its" world reduces to discussion about 
th e world , which, in turn , reduces to discuss ion about logical form and 
truth-functions. 
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The upshot of thi s tidy analysis is that th e ea rl y Wittgenstcin inten-
tionally tri ed to minimize any attention paid to his own reader - the con-
crete human subj ect who willfully leafs the pages of th e Tractatus. This 
conclusion is also supported by the phys ical structure of the Tractatus. 
First, no first-person pronoun occurs in any primary statements (those 
numbered 1, 2, 3 .. . 7) or secondary sta tem ents (those numbered to th e 
first decimal place, as in 1.1, 1.2, etc. ). 11 The tenor of the logically impor-
tant propositions is consistently objective, impersonal, and unive rsal in 
such a way as to imply that concrete human persons are incidental to th e 
...:-;---
di scussion. =--
Second, th e presence of first-person pronouns in th e elucidatory re-
marks shows that concrete human selves attract Wittgenstein 's reluctant at-
tention only to the ex tent that th eir stu )idity threatens to blind them to 
Wittgenstein 's views. It is easy o ge(the impress ion that if everyone thought 
as clea rly on matters as W ittgcnstein himself, he could have trimmed the 
"ponderous" eighty pages down to seven simple statements, and th en again 
down to just one: "W11 ereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be sil ent." 
Yet, the fact that W ittgenst in paid even reluctant attention to his readers 
foreshadowed the way concrete human subj ects were to become his later 
obsess ion. 
The primacy, here and now, of concre te human persons will be shown 
in later works by W ittgen tein 's explicit attention to unravel ing conceptual 
puzzles that entangle his particular students. But surprisingly, thi s shift is 
already anticipated by the concessions h e grants to the readers of th e Trac-
tatus. His use of ex tra white space is deliberately arranged to assist readers 
to make connections between major logical sections. Thus, for example, he 
breaks the text thi s way: 
5·5563 .. . 
5·557 .. . 
!:white space] 
[four unnumbered lines of text ] 
[white space] 
5·5571 ... 
5·6 ... 
Indeed, the fact that he includes elucidation at all may be an indication of 
<!.X his willingness to compromise the philosophi cal silence for the benefit of 
th e reader. 
'=----
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Of course, if the only challenge I can muster to a picture of Wittgen-
stein as one committed to th e invisibility of th e human subj ec t in th e prac-
ti ce of ph ilosophy consists in the appearance of personal pronouns (coupl ed 
with judicious use of wh ite space) in th e elucidatory rema rks aimed at ac-
com modating obtuse readers, then the picture of Wittgenstein that emerges 
from th e Tractatus is one of an Enlightenment thinker par excellence. Tb 
effectively de£ ndmy claim that th e unily of Wittgenstein's philosophy can 
be narrated as th e migration of the human subj ect that begins in the Trac-
tatus, I must uncover three kinds of tension in the Tractatus that only make 
sense as anticipatiOns of Wittgenstein's later turn to the subj ect. First is th j j 
logical puzzle of the book's conclusion. The second is the tension between 
t he book's content an d1ts style. The third tension anses from th e hidden L._,~...._ 
~tory! me of the Tractatus. • 
Surmounting the Tl·actatus 
· ) 
First, it is easy to feel cheated when one reaches the conclusion of the Trac-
tatus: 
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who under-~ 
stands me finally recognizes them as senseless . .. . 
How does Wittgenstein imagine himselfto have defended suc h a claim? 
He cannot say, "I have now accurately described th e way the world really 
is and th erefore you, O h reader, are compell ed to accept the conclusion 
that based on this tructure of the world, spell ed out in my former proposi-
tions, th e former propositi on themselves are nonsensical! " This is precisely 
what his teacher Bertrand Russell thought he was up to. During Wittgen-
stein 's doctoral Viva Russell charged that Wittgenstein was inconsistent for 
claiming to have exp~ssed i~leffable truths by mea ns of nonsensical propo- ( 
sitions. Wittgenstein's reply is telling: "Don 't worry, I know you'll never ~ 
understand it." 12 Was Wittgenstein's reply-an instance of sophomoric arro-
gance, or was something else going on? Surely Wittgenstein knew that th e 
basis for accep ting a set of propositions as senseless can never be th e sense 
of those very propositions . That a proposition lacks sense means precisely 
thi s, that its "meaning" cannot enter into its own justification. 
Yet when he reached th e point in th e Tractatus wh re he claimed that 
eve rything he has sa id up to that point was literally meaningless, we are 
tempted to play the part of Anselm 's Boso and ask, "What did he mean by 
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that?" Is this an unfair question? Not if there is another way that ineffabl e 
truths can be communicated to us. W ittgenstein cla imed that language is 
co terminous with th e world ; th e limits of language are the limits of th e 
world. n If we take li im literall y for a moment, we must conclude that it 
makes no sense to speak about the limits, because both th e boundary and 
what lies beyond the boundary are off limits to language . And if discursive 
reasoning is a func tion of language, then we cann ot even "think" th e 
boundary: "for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be 
able to think both sides of thi s limi t." 14 Now, there is no problem in the fac t 
that we are invited, even exhorted, to contemplate the world as a limited 
whole so long as contemplation (Anschauung) is linked to feeling (Gefiihl ) 
rath er than thought. 15 But th ere is a probl em in using language to make 
such an offe r since th e phrases "the world sub s{Jecie aetemitatis" or "the 
world as a limited whole" (6 -45) are literally "inexpressible" (6.522). All such 
notions- th e limits of the world , das Mystische, logical form , God,-are 
m etaphys ical terms; to speak them is to speak unintelligibly (unsinnig), for 
th ey are terms lacking re ference (Bedeutung) .16 W ittgenstein concluded 
A. that correct applica ti on of ph ilosophy is the policing ofl anguage: sentences 
must be restricted to those of natural science, whil e putative metaphysical 
claims must be debunked. However, the sentences ofTractatus belong nei-
th er to natural science nor to metaphysics. And for this reason , the Tracta-
tus was just as self-stultifying as were the principle of verifi abilily (which was 
itself unverifi able) and the principl e of falsifiability (which was itself un-
falsifiabl e) . 
Smi1ewhat surpri singly, W iltgenstein acknowledged this problem but 
did not confess it as a fa ult. W hy not? M idway through th e Tractatus Witt-
genstein made th e istinc ti on between form and content. Propositions 
which are false with respe~t to their content can neverth eless precipita te 
trustworthy conclusions by virtue of th eir form .17 The sentence, "The bas-
ketball is green," wh en , in fac t, the basketball is orange, is an example of a 
sentence that is false with respect to content. However, such a sentence still 
correctly conveys th e fact that basketballs are the sorts of things th at are col-
orecl. This fac t is conveyed by m eans of th e sentence's participation in th e 
logical form of basketball s. Apparently W it.tgenstein thought the same pos-
sibili ty holds for senseless propositi ons1 8 T he senseless propositions of the 
Tractatus, insofar as they expres (cwsdrucken) logical form , can still direc t 
those who surmount them to see th e world rightly. 19 
T h us the escape route taken by Wittgenstcin to avoid the inconsistency 
with which Russell charged him had to do with th e3})il ily of lar_lguage_to 
show what it is unable to say: -
..... -
- - - -"'1 
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4 .022 The proposition shows its sense. 
The proposition shows how things stand , if it is true. And it 
says, that th ey do so stand. 
In this way language can possibly communica te the inexpress ible. But there 
is another way to read th e Tractatus that circumvents self-stultification. This 
can be best illustra ted by a short detour into the literary method of Stanley 
Fish. 
Fish makes a convincing case that a reader-response mode] of literary 
criticism can best account for what otherwise might be an embarrassing spot 
in Plato's Phaedrus. Translator Walter Hamilton reminds us that "th e Phae-
drus has sometimes been described as Plato's farewell to literature," largely 
due to Socrates' explicit conclusion in the final section of the dialogue: 
1o beli eve, on the one hand, that a written composition on any subject 
must be to a large exten t the creation of fancy; that nothing worth se-
rious attention has ever been written in prose or verse ... to believe this, 
I say, and to let all else go is to be the sort of man, Phaedrus, that you 
and I might well pray that we may both become2 0 
The problem, of course, is that Socrates' pronouncement against all litera-
ture seems to consign the Phaedrus itself to the same problematic status. 
However, Fish argues that th e geme of Phaedrus demands that we .look for 
its unity not in its form al structure, as if Phaedrus were a self-contained ar-
tifact, but in its coherence as a function of the interplay between the reader 
and th e text. 'faking this approach will enabl e us to see that 
Rath er than a single susta ined argument, th e Phaedrus is a se ri es of dis-
creet conversa tions or seminars, each with its own carefully posed ques-
tion, ensuing di scuss ion, and firmly drawn conclusion, but so arranged 
that to enter the spirit and assumptions of any one of these self-enclosed 
units is impli citly to rejec t th e spirit and assumptions of the unit im-
mediately precedi ng2 1 
Fish is not simply saying that th e reader imaginatively enters into the dia-
logue at th e same level as a main character (Phaedrus), so that the growth 
of his or her knowledge is simply th e same incrementa], piecemeal path \ 
taken by Phaedrus. Rather, th e reader stands in a dialectic with the text as ~Pi 
a whole, something Socrates' student would have been unable to do . 
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For example, Fish explains that ea rly on th e reader is forced to deal with 
a contradi ction of whi ch Socrates and Phaedrus are simply unaware. Phae-
drus recounts a speech he heard given by Lysias, which receives Socrates' 
just criti cism for its sloppy structure. However, when Socrates offers a well-
crafted substitute, he is forced to criti cize his own version for being simply 
a piece of rh etori c. Fish summarizes: "In other words, Lysias' speech is bad 
because it is not well put togeth er and Socrates' speech is bad because it is 
well put together." Wh ile the observant reader may detec t that th e criterion 
for "good" has changed between th ese two criti cisms, the cl ever reader will 
reali ze as well that the introduction of th e new standard "invalidates the 
very basis on which th e whole discussion ... had hitherto been proceed-
ing."22 However, the point of thi tension in the reader's experi ence of th e 
text, claims Fish, is to urge the reader not to go back and re-evaluate Lysias' 
speech by th e new criteri on, but to go on: 
At that moment, this ea rly section of th e dialogue will have achi eved 
its true purpose, which is, paradoxically, to bring the reader to th e point 
where he [or she] is no longer interested in the issues it treats- no 
longer interested because he I: or she] has come to see that the real issues 
exist at a higher level of generality. Thus, in a way peculiar to di alec-
tical form and experience, this space of prose and argument wi ll have 
been the vehicle of its own abandonm entY 
Fish's analysis of Phaedrus illustrates the difference between showing 
I and saying that we have already enco untered in Wittgenstein. Claiming that a text shows what it cannot say is an allusion to th e performative na-ture oflanguage. As the ordinary language ph ilosopher John L. Austin put it, the written text becomes a speech-a ct whose felicity depends, in part, on 
th e uptake by its rea clers.24 To be sure, there are issues such as th e reader's 
ey sight, intelligence, and literacy that affect uptake. But th e reader's 
"vision" -the reader's penchant for seeing some aspects rath er th an 
others-plays a central role in his or her abili ty to "get it." The genius of 
Plato, as expressed in the pages of Phaedrus, is shown by the way he uti! ized 
the reader-text dialec tic to shape the manner in wh ich the reader perceives. 
The Phaednts is not processing an argument but transform ing th e reader's 
viSIOn. 
Further, in order to transform th e reader's vision effectively, th e dia-
lecti c which exists between reader and th e-tex t-as-a-whole must initiall y 
engage th e reader at his or her parti cular point of departure. "Going on" 
from here is not a simple matter of th e reader sys temati cally abandon ing 
--
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"false" beliefs and embracing "true" ones, but a matter of transcending th e 
con fli ct between rival beliefs by seeing matters in a deeper way. But this 
means that if the dialectic is successful , th en, as th e reader's outl ook is 
changed, he or she will reac h the end of a section of a dialogue and dis-
card it as "element<uy." 
To read the Phaedrus, then, is to use it up; for the va lue of any point 
in it is that it gets you (not any sustained argument) to the next point, 
which is not so much a point (in logical-demonstrative terms) as a level 
of insight. It is thus a self-consuming artifac t, a mimetic enactment in 
the reader's experi ence of th e Platonic ladder in which each rung, as 
it is nego tiated, is kicked away.25 
The ques tion remains, "To what ex tent does the Tractatus function~ 
a self-consuming arti fac t?" Wittgenstein appears to answer this qu estion inj 
an uncharac teri sti cally straightforward manner. 
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who under-
stands me fin ally recogni zes th em as senseless, when he has 
climbed out through them, on th em, over th em. (He must so 
to speak throw away th e ladder, after he has climbed up on it. ) 
He must sumwunt these fJrofJositions; then he sees th e world 
rightly26 
Yet we must also ask how much Wittgenstein thinks that the enlightening 
power of th e T1·actatus is wrapped up in its stwcture. In other words, is th e 
"ladder" suitable for climbing beca use of its logical structure or, rath er, be-
cause its "poin t" ca n only be go tten by the reader whose outlook has been 
transform ed via engaging th e text-as-a-whole, di alectically in the manner 
described by Fish? As evidence of the form er, we ca n point to th e meticu-
lou attention Wittgenstein paid to the logical rigor of the primary propo-
sitions, each predicate becoming the subjec t of the foll owing statement, and 
so on. However, th ere is at least one compelling reason for rejecting this 
option. 
Gottlob Frege, who possessed one of th e brightes t logical minds of 
Wittgenstein's clay, was judged by Wittgenstein to have entirely misunder-
stood the Tractatus. In a letter written to Russell elated August 1919 Wittgen-
stein confided that "I gather that he [Frege] doesn't understand a word of 
it all ."27 How can this be? Perhaps we have here a clue that a dialec tical reac~ 
ing is more important to correct exegesis than attenti on to th e logical j 
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structure of th e Tractatus. For surely Fregc co uld have followed th e logi-
cal machinations of th e Tractatus as well as, or better th an, anyone. 
Frege has been credited with the removal of th e human subject from 
philosophy of language by discarding John Locke's "idea"-idea as mere 
psychol ogism.28 Locke had suggested that objects and eve nts gave rise to 
ideas in our mind. We th en subsequently affix labels to these ideas in the 
form of speech. The upshot of th e Lockean scheme is th e imposs ibility of 
a public measuremen t of the correspondence between a speaker's ideas and 
words, for only the speaker has unmediated access to his or her own id eas. 
But in consequence ofFrege's suggestion , modern philosophers oflanguagc 
no longer troubled with th e middle term of the "word - idea -world" chain 
but purported, instead, to do philosophy of language "objectively," by con-
sidering only the relation between public sentences and fJubli c sta tes of 
affairs. 
In telling correspondence with Wittgenstein, Frege claimed th at Trac-
tarian statements 1 andz had identi cal mea nings. Wittgenstein responded, 
'The sense of both propositions is one an d the same, but not the ideas that 
I associated with them when I wrote them." 29 By th e words, "when I wrote 
th em," Wittgcnstein may have been trying to draw attention to th e stance 
a given reader takes toward th e text and th e fact that any such stance cou ld 
(as his notebooks show to be true in his own ca e), and ought to, change. 
Wittgenstein felt it absolutely necessa ry to ge t past th e propositions of the 
Tractatus as he himself had done. Only by doing so might one see the world 
rightly. 30 The use of th e adverb "rightly" (richtig) here to modify the verb 
"to see" (sehen) was delibera te: Wittgenstein's aim was that th e reader at-
tain a correct manner of viewing rath er th an secure a correct pi c ture of 
reality, because, as he would sum marize some yea rs later, "th e sea rch says 
more than th e discover)',"l1 
,.,... It should not be surprising, on this account, that Frege, who tried to en-
gage th e text on purely objective terms, was bound to miss th e point. And 
it is likewise not surprising th at Wittgenstein himself shou ld go beyond th e 
Tractatus in search of a more fitting pedagogy. 
Content vs . Style r-() 
\ 
If we accept Wittgenstein~1ction between showing and saying, then 
we can get past th e ques tion of whether th e Tractatus is self-consistent in 
what it says in order to address th e second, deeper tension in th e Traclct -
tus: Does what th e tex t show fit its manner of expression? 
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Imagine leafing through a philosophy journal which contains an arti-
cle arguing that the "real" meaning of some particular poem can be sta ted 
by proposition X. Imagine further that th e argumen t offered by this author 
analyzes the poem, line by line, reducing each line to symbolic logic. Once 
the symboliza tion is complete th e author applies the appropriate logical cal-
culus, retranslates the symbolic logic into propositional form, and "Presto!" 
the logically validated conclusion is miraculously identical to the author's 
thesis. Fra nkly, we wouldn 't know what to ·make of such an articl e. The 
genre in which the poem is discussed is so distant from poetry that we would 
be justified in wondering, not merely whether th e author is reading this par-
ticular poem rightly, but whether the author knows what it means to read i 
poetry at all. This illustration shows the way genre and style must "fit" th e 
message if th e text is not to be self-defea ting. Lawrence Hinman puts it in 
the strongest terms: 
what one is saying se ts the limits of valid philosophical discourse . A 
philosophi ca l style is wrong when it naively steps outside th e limits 
which are being es tablished by what i being said, i. e., when th e pre-
suppositions of a certain mode of speaking contradict what is being 
sa id n 
Are the style and genre of th e Tractahts "wrong"? Wittgenstein certainly 
chose his style delibera tely. Fearing the readers might miss the logical scaf-
folding of the text (by reading it as a uni-dimensional treatise), Wittgenstein 
refused to have the Tractatus published in stages (as one potential publisher 
offered 33) and also refused to omit the decima ls . ~ Only in its final form did 
Wittgenstein think that the Tractatus counted as both philosophy and th e • 
sort of litera ture that in its artform could show what could not be sa id, 
namely, th e relation of language to th e worlcJ.l~Wittgenstein had already 
grasped the intrinsic difficulty of using language to say how language relates 
to th e world (a "discovety" sometimes attributed to the Wittgenstein's "later" 
philosophy), since th ere is no way to transcend language to speak about it. 
The naive realist claims that language "pictures" the world but is then hard-
pressed to produce a criterion by which the putative correspondence between 
a proposition and a state of affairs can be measured. (Where could one stand 
to make such a call? And with what language might this be expressed?) 
Thinkers from Bertrand Russell (Wittgenstein 's mentor at Cambridge) to 
Polish logician Alfred T~mki have typically answered this objection by posit-
ing a higher order language (what Tarski calls metalanguage) comprised 
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of words like 'represent' and 'correspond ' in order to refer to th e relation-
ship between "lower-order language" and "the world ." But, of course, it is 
always fair to ask for the criteria aga inst wh ich metalanguage ca n be 
checked for correct employmen t. Thus an infinite regress. 
-~ Wittgenstein avo ided the problem of correspondence altogether. He 
bega n with th e claim that th ere is no way to utilize language to describe th e 
extra-linguisti c means by wh ich it corresponds with states of affa irs. 
4. 12 Propositions ca n represent the whole rea li ty but they ca nnot 
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represen t what th ey must have in common with rea li ty in order 
to represent it-the logica l form. 
To be able to represent the logical form , we should have to 
be able to put ourselves with th e propositions out ide of logic, 
that is ou tside the world . 
The propositions show th e logical form of reality. 
They exhibit it. 
(Granted, Wittgenstein assumed that language models or "pictures" th e 
~orld , but of grea ter interes t to him was how this picturing works. 36 He rea-
soned that the way pictures represent is by holding something in com mon 
with what is pictured. Both the pi cture and th e pi ctured have th e sa me 
"form." For example, th e form that a photograph share with the room it de-
picts includes things like spatial relations (e.g., "to th e right of") and color 
relations (e.g., "is bluer than"). For Wittgenstein , "form " connoted th e en-
tire logical space that a state of affa irs embodi es. The logical form marks th e 
boundari es of th e world, that is, of the limits of all logically possible arrange-
ments. To th e ex ten t that language pictures the world, it too shares this form. 
Thus, th e only co rrespondence worth troubling about is th e correspon-
dence between the form of th e wo rld and th e syntax of language. Here it 
would be better to say that th e ",eorre pondence" of language to th e world 
is the co-participation oflanguage an d world in logica l Form. This is why 
Wittgenstcin could write that for all sensible propositions, "the propositions 
'f/ and '~p ' have opposite senses, but to th em corresponds one and th e same 
real i ly."37 
So th en, in Wittgenstein 's thinking, "reality" or "th e world" encom-
passes all possible cases, and this world is bounded by logical form . 
5.61 Logic fill s th e world: the li mits of th e world are also its limi ts. 
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Howeve r, since language also embodi es this fo rm, we ca nnot say what logi-
ca lly we cann ot think. 38 The difficulty that faced Wittgenstein became ap- ) 
pa rent in his rea liz~ ti on that if"form" is the means by which r.epresentation · 
occ urs, then form 1tself cannot be represented, p1ctmed, or spoken. But by 
th e sa me token, how ca n he claim to know it and even be so presu mptu-
ous as to give it a name? Aga in th e distinction between showing and say-
ing comes to th e re ·cue. 
In Wittgenstein 's ea rly view, we perceive form directly without th e me-
diation suppli ed by language . To put th e point di fferentl y, if we grasp a 
proposition (or a photograph) as a fJicture, rather than as an artifact, we have 
already grasped its form . We would not know what to make of a person who 
sa id, "Yes, T ee that is a pi cture of Mt. Rainier, but how do I kn ow the form 
is the sa me in both cases ifi can't spell it out?" Form is not elusive for being 
unsayable but is eve rywhere immediately present to us in each recognition 
of a pi cture as a picture. 
Wittgenstein hoped that for all its literally nonsensical propositions 
about unsaya ble things, th e T'ractatus shows what cannot be said. If the Trac-
tatus is a picture, it must already embody in its crystall ine structure the form 
of th e world. Hinman describes it th is way: 
Thus th e grammatica l simplicity of th e main propositi ons in th e Trac-
tatus, th e orderlin ess of th e presentati on, th e way in whi ch ce rtain 
propositi ons stan d out as fundamental and others are given as deriva-
ti ve, and th e ve ry finality that characterized Wittgenstein 's pronoun ce-
ments are all aspects of his styl e wh ich seem to refl ect th e basic claims 
about th e relationship between language and th e world developed in 
th e Tractatus. 39 
The logica l structure of th e Tractatus, which constitutes, in part, its genre, 
succeeds in showing th e logical scaffolding of th e world. Ye t, in th e midst 
of th is showing, as Frege complain ed, th e th eses appea r to lack adequate 
support. 40 This, of course, anticipates Wittgenstein 's later claim that if th ere/ 
were uch things as th eses in philosophy, they would be self-evident. 41 But 
in the Tractatus, this lack shows something that is of the grea test importance 
to Wittgenstein. Seen in all its logical reli ef, th~even th eses of th e Tracta-
tus display th e limits of language. 
__.... .. 
Wiltgenstein's style in th e Tractatus is di ctated by two considerations: 
on th e one hand, th e ultimately simple and univocal character of the 
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relation between language and the world means that that wh ich shows 
itself here can indeed show itself once for all in its fundamental form ; 
on th e other hand , th e fa ct that saying must be replaced by letting 
something show itself means that language in this context must almost 
have the terseness of a gesture.42 
So far, so good. Once Wittgenstcin began to think in terms of th e 
human capacity to perceive form direc tly, th e focal point of philosophy al o 
began to change for him. Increasingly, th e big question of philosophy of 
language was not whether the correspondence between language and world 
could be demonstrated in some subj ec t-neutral way, but whether we as 
human speakers were ski ]led enough to recognize the limits of language. 
( Thus, th e first two tensions in th e Tractatus can be und erstood as antici-
( ~ting W3enstein 's turn to the subject. The third tension that undermines 
the apparentTractarian message that human subjec ts are incidental to phi-
losophy is the fact that the style of th e Tractatus also displays th e narrative 
<(!ihape of Wittgenstein's own conceptual journey. This tension beca me un-
bearable for Wittgenstein and ultimately drove him to return to academia 
after his premature "retiremen t" from philosophy.43 
The Storyline of the Tractatus ? 
In a letter to Ludwig von F icker, probably written in November 1919, 
Wittgenstein explained that th e Tractatus conta ined "that which rea lly oc-
curred to me-and how it occurred to me."H At face value this may only 
mean that Wittgenstein claimed th ese thoughts as his own. But it also may 
I~ be an allusion to .tl .ac~t th e "logical" progress ion of th e Tractatus was roughly an~ _o wgraph1_:a!jne. We can chscover the relatJon between th e 
logical progression -of the Tractatus and th e chronological progress ion ofhis 
sourcebook for the Tractatus, th e Notebooks 1914- 1916, by mapping the deci-
mal number of each Tractarian statement against th e date of th e parailel 
entry in the Notebooks: sta tement 2.17 corresponds with th e entry for Oc-
tober 20, 1914, statement 3.001 with that of November 1, 1914, and so forth _-IS 
What we find is expressed by the figure that follows. 
There are two striking features of the distribution. First is the 198-day 
gap in entries between Jun e 22, 1915, and April15, 1916.46 Second, despite 
this gap, the development of Wittgenstein 's thought during th e entire pe-
riod is expressed by the straight line that diagonally bisec ts th e graph. I am 
not suggesting that this correlation is proof positive of an expli cit historical 
development in Wittgenstein's thinking. The correlation itself may reAect 
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nothing more profound th an that Wittgenstein simply stopped th inking 
about each Tractarian thesis once he had go tten it: clown on pape( Rather, . 
I am sugges ting that the figure illustrates th e possibility of an intrinsic rela- '•* 
tionship between his life story and the logical structure of the Tractatu0 0n 
this view, Wi ttgenstei n's own life reRec tecl what th e Tractatus advoca tes; 
as his thinking advanced in tim e he sys tematica lly discarded each "rung" 
of the ladder he had constru cted. In other words, th e Twctatus chronicles 
Wittgenstein's own conceptual transform ation en route to th e in effa ble 
realm of das Mystiche. His decade-long hiatus from philosophy after writ-
ing th e Tractatus is evidence that he hSid surmounted the entire ladder. Th is 
-surprising result reveals that the Tractatus, despite it austere, objective, and 
totalizing logical structure, neverth eless contains a hidden map of Wittgen-
stcin's own life. Far from being marginalized, th e philosophizing subject- ; 
namely Ludwig Wittgcnstcin - is at th e ve ry hea rt of th e Tractatus. 
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What can be concluded from these data? F irst, if my suggestion is cor-
rect, Wittgenstein 's explicitly di smiss ive attitude toward human subj ec ts en-
gaged in philosophy stands in lasting tension with the autobiographi cal fl ow 
of the Tractatus itself, a tension that draws attention to the poss ibility that 
human subj ects such as W ittgenstein could undergo profo und conceptual 
transformation. T he hope for such transformati on was to become central 
to his rapidly matur iug philosophical outlook. Second, th e overt structure 
of th e Tractatus-as shown by th e decimals- barely conceals the narrative 
struc ture embedded in the eluc idative remarks of th e text. If the unity of 
the Tractatus is neither logical nor topical but narrative, th en , a fortiori , th e 
uni ty ofWittgenstein's ea rly and later wo rks is likewi e the uni ty of W ittgen-
stein 's own life. Third, W ittgenstein wrote in his preface that he expected 
only readers of the Tractatus "who have th em selves a! ready th ought th e 
th oughts which are expressed in it-or simil ar thoughts" would be able to 
understand the Tractatus. T herefore, if th e Tractatus contains a record of 
Wittgenstein 's own journey toward the ethical (and other aspects of das Mys-
tische expressed by propositi ons 6 and 7), then it is poss ible-even prefer-
able- to read th e Tractatus as a manual for ass isting its readers to make 
similar journcys.47 
PL AY ING W ITH P E D AGO GY 
I have spilled a lot of ink correlating tensions in the Tractatus with Wittgen-
stcin's own early conceptual journey. Wittgenstein's later period began with 
( an experiment in a pedagogical style that, in effec t, inve rted the priori ty of 
( th e Tractatus~s logical structure: the for~c rl y insignificant elucidations be-
cam e th e chi ef means In di ssolvmg phil osophi cal puzzles, whil e the for-
merly param ount philosophi cal theses com e to be ex Josed as l anguage 
gon e haywire . T hi s ca n be seen very cl earl y in his "Lecture on E thi cs" 
(1929), PhilosofJhi cal Remarks (ca . 1930), and "Remarks on Fraze r's G olden 
Bough" (begun in 1931). But pe rhaps th e most important work fo r eeing 
his changing styl e is th e so-called Big Ty fJescrifJt (1932-34). 
T he historical context of th e Big TyfJ escript is far different from that of 
th e Tl·actatus. T he latter was drafted in th e isolated and auste re mounta ins 
of Norway and then pieced togeth er whil e Wittgenstein was on th e Russ ian 
front. During this period, Wittgenstcin was joined to th e grea ter academi c 
community only by an occas ional letter. In contrast, th e Big TypescrifJt -
th e bulk of whi ch has been recently published in E nglish as th e Philo-
so fJhical Grammar-was construc ted after W ittgenstein had re turned to 
--
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philosophy from a decade hi atus and deeply ensconced himself in Cam-
bridge academic life, having honed his pedagogical skills on two years of 
live class room lectures. The ... aroma of "le_s!!dre" permeates th e Big Ty{J e- f 
scri{Jt and gives it more the lo6'k and feel of anj;!.troductory textbook than 
any of the rest of Wittgenstein's writings. Wittgenstein himself admitted as 
much in a marginal note un covered by Rush Rhees : "My book might be 
ca ll ed: PhilosofJhical Grammar. T his titl e would no doubt have the smell 
of a textbook title but that doesn't matter for behind it th ere is th e book."48 
Among those fea tures that contribute to the "textbook smell " is the at-
tentiOJl.,Pa id directly to the reader-as-pupil. As in his Cambridge lectures, 
Wittgenstein does all the talking. The reader is trea ted as a merely pass ive 
recipient of information. However, that the reader is included in the frequent 
"we" and "us" that litter the pages is a notable departure from the terse ges-
tun~s of-the Tractatus . The Philosophical Grammar does not quite fit th e 
dialogical genre of the later works (for instance, the Investigations), nor does 
it match th e autobiograph ical musings of the Philosophical H.emarks. 
Rather, th e genre of Philosophical Grammar might more appropriately be 
labeled "transcribed lecture." 
The orga ni za tion al o adds to th e textbook feel of th e Philosophical 
Grammar. Un like the Tractatus, whose table of contents (had one been 
written) would have been identical to th e book itself, the table of contents 
in the Philosophical Grammar does not summarize an argument but, rath er, 
displays a cqllec ti n ofl~lma rks reminding one of th e journey taken, or 
anti cipating one to be taken, by t1e reader. 49 In this way, the Philoso fJhical ? 
Grammar is organ ized "geographi ca ll y" and the table of contents serves as ) 
its roaclmap or guide book. However, the ques t Wittgenstein imagined for 
his reader differs from th e sort of transformation Wittgens tein will later seek 
for readers of the Investigations. For one thing, the starting points of the 
journey-those confu ions tha t are bewitching the mind of th e reader of 
the Philoso{Jhical Grammar-as well as the endpoints for each stage along 
the way are fi xed by Wittgenste in in advance. T his is why th e Philosophical 
Grammar does not "li ve" like th e later dialogical Investigations; th e Philo-
so{Jhical Grammar can only engage a reader who fits Wittgenstein's stereo-
type of "t;Qe..confuse.cl pupil." Perhaps this is also why he never was sa ti sfi ed 
suffi ciently with th e manuscript to publi sh it: since th e route was so clea rly 
mapped out fo r the stud ent in advance, the book smacks of being gov-
erned by th e very sort of th eoretical agenda that Wittgenstein was trying 
to repudiate. 
Imagine th at a form er reader of the Tractatus picks up the Philoso{Jhi-
cal Grammar and, thumbing through it, pauses to read the conclusion to 
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Part I, Section Ill: "What interests us in the sign, th e meaning which mat-
ters for us is what is embodied in th e grammar of th e sign." What Wittgen-
stein is talking abou t is amb iguous. This is because only an insider-one of 
th e "us" -can properly decode th e message. This is but one exa mple of his 
new pedagogy: the summary statements at th e end of eac h section of th e 
Philosophical Grammar are not conclusions of arguments. If th ey were, any-
one could get an inkling of th eir sense and take th e further troubl e to read 
th e entire section only if he or she wa nted to fo llow the justifica tion of th e 
position that th e conclusion summarized. But th e remarks which terminate 
a given section of the Philosophical Grammar do not function as th e con-
clus ion of an argument (let alone as a self-evident truism). Rath er, th ey 
functi on as a quiz to test the student's clarity of th ought at just this stage of 
his or her intell ec tual journ ey. As such , th ey are never final destination s, 
...,but rath e r~~ docking poin t;; th at signal th e completion on ly of a 
particular leg of a longer journey to be con tinu ed by engaging following 
sections. Thus what look like philosophica l th eses in th e Philosophical 
Grammar are not, beca use th ey are not universally accessible. 
Wh ile the conclusions are not unive rsa lly access ible, Wi ttgenstci n does 
seem to begin th e book with a particularly afAi cted student in mind. For 
students of philosophy sin ce Frege have been carefu lly schooled to believe, 
mistakenly, that "understanding" (whatever that is) is separable from "lan-
guage": 
s 2 
How can one talk about "und ers tanding" and "not under-
standing" a proposition? Surely it is not a proposition until it's 
understood? ... 
We regard und erstanding as th e essential thing, and signs as 
something in essential. ... 
The uninitiated reader is likely to answer th e qu estion of §1, "Surely it 
is not a proposition until it's understood ?" in th e affirmat·ivc, that is, as a 
res tatement of Frege's view that a sentence achi eves th e status of "proposi-
tion" if and only if th ere ca n be correlated to it something ca ll ed its "mea n-
ing." To such a person, S1 might also sugges t that th e techni ca l term 
"proposition " be reserved for each string of words that possesses a correla-
tive mea ning. But surprisingly, and on th e contrary, S1 expresses a double 
entendre foreshadowing where Wittgenstein wanted to take the reader. I-Ie 
was interested not in delinea ting th e logical status of propositions (as he was 
in the Tractatus ) but in clarifying th e notion we commonly call "under-
standing." He plans to move the student from Frege's mistaken view to his 
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own view th at "unde rstanding" is in ex tri ca bly bound up with the use of 
language. 
After this inten tionally duplicitous star t, Wittgenstein parades a se ri es 
of illustrations and questions before th e reader to nudge him or her from 
the received account of understanding as "seeing" to Wittgenstein's own ac-
count of understanding as that which is em bodied in one's use oflanguage. 
Consider th e following progression of quotations (see p. 32) from the open-
ing pages of th e PhilosofJhical Grammar coupled with descriptions of th e 
reader's evolving conception of "understanding." 
In a scant eight pages of text, th e concept of "understanding" has meta-
morphosed severa l times. F irst, the notion of "mental seeing" changed to 
something like "translation" and then again to a concept so fluid it defies 
definition. Wittgenstein then drew a ttention to the behavioral component 
of understanding, and, by linking understanding with the abili ty to answer 
ques tions like "What does this sentence say?" he suggested that readers pro-
visionally consider understanding as some type of precondition to applica-
bon. F inally, Wi ttgenstein guid ed his readers to take the now managea ble 
step to em brace his conclusion that understanding is best thought of as th e 
actual applica tion ofla nguage. -
The ambigui ty with wl1 ich Wittgenste in began th e Philosophical 
Grammar was central to his developing pedagogical method. F irst, th e ini-
tial paragraph was deliberately open to a misreading which his fol.lowing pa-
rade of remarks systematically untangled. Second, the fac t thatthe openin.g 
1;;; tence was vuln e rable to contrary lite ral readings showed th e point he 
tri ed to make explicit: to possess understanding is to possess the skill nec-
essa ry for using a string of wo rds according to a range of gram matically al-
lowable combinations within a given context. T hird, it served as a reminder 
of th e lesson lea rn ed . Having read it once, th e student who goes back to 
review sees something entirely different from th e uninitiated person who 
reads it for the first time. T he answer to "Surely it is not a proposition until 
it is understood?" (S1) is still "Yes," but the tutored student now realizes tha t 
th e reason this is so is beca use "understanding the meaning" is bound up 
with the proposition (i.e., its use) and not separable from it, as initially pre-
supposed. 
The pedagogical style that the opening pages illustrate is consistently 
maintain ed throughout th e PhilosofJhical Grammar. 1o repeat, of all of 
W ittgenstein 's writings, this one most resembles a textbook. T he table of 
contents is not an analyti ca l outlin e showing the logical relation of parts. 
The logical rela tions within sl and between $1 and Sz, as well as those be-
tween Section I and Section II, and aga in between Part I and Part II, are not 
The Concept of Understanding in th e Philoso{Jhical Grammar 
.. Understanding would be some-
thing like seeing a picture . . .. (S2) 
"In certain of th eir appli ca tions the 
words 'understand', 'mean' refer to a 
psychologica l reaction while hea ring, 
reading, uttering etc. a sentence. In th <l t 
case understanding is the phenomenon 
that occurs when I hea r a sentence in a 
Familiar language .... " (S3) 
"U nderstanding a sentence is more 
aki n to understanding a piece of music 
than one might think." (S4) 
"How curious: we should like to explain 
that understanding of a gesture as a 
translation into wo rds, and the under-
standing of words as a translati on into 
gestures." (Ss) 
"Do we understand C hristian 
Morgenstern's poems, or Lewis 
Carroll 's poem 'Jabberwocky'? In these 
cases it's very clear that the concept of 
understanding is a Au id one." (Ss) 
"To Linderstand a sentence can 
mean . . . to be able to answer the qu es-
ti on 'what does this sentence say?"' (\ 6) 
"We speak of the understandi ng of a 
sentence as a condition of being able to 
apply it. We say "I ca nnot obey an or ler 
ifJ do not understand it" .... (S8) 
"'Understanding a word' may mean : 
knowing how it is used; being able to 
apply it." (Sw) 
"When someone interprets, or under-
stands, a sign in one sense or another, 
what he is doing is taking a step in a cal-
cul us (like a calculation). What he does 
is roughl y what he does if he gives ex-
pression to his interpretation." (S13) 
o (the assumed starting position 
of reader: understanding-as-
mental-sight) 
• understanding is taken to be a mental 
event but, importantly, a mental 
event which accompanies the activi-
ties of using language. 
• understanding-as-hearing. What is 
required to achieve understanding 
may not be insight but a trained ear 
or skillful hearing. 
• vnderstanding as familiarity with. 
the connection between words and 
gestures. 
• tmderstcmding as a fluid concept; 
what understanding amounts to 
defJends u{Jon each context in which 
language is used. 
• understanding as fJossessing a 
behavioral comfJonent (e.g., to give 
a verbal res fJonse in answer to a 
question) 
• understanding as afJrecondition to 
the afJfJlication of language. 
• vnderstanding as the skill of /mowing 
how to afJfJiy language. 
• understanding is identi fied with the 
actual afJplication of language. 
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self-supporting. 'Rather, the firmn ess of these logical connections is supplied 
by the incrementally enlightened mind of the reader. As a result, th tabl e 
of contents is an assemblage of reminders-sometimes phrases, sometimes 
whole sentences -of th e lessons to be learned in the reading of the whole. 
In this way, the Philosophical Grammar is a "self-consuming artifact" 
in a different, though related, sens from that used by Fish: th e Philosophi-
cal Grammar consumes not itself, but the human selves that move through 
the volume. The reading of the Philoso{Jhical Grammar presupposes at) 
every point that the reader has reached a certain level of conceptual clarity \ 
requisite for th e next pericope. For example, Section II of Part I asks, "Can 
what th e rul es of grammar say about a word be de cribed in another way by 
describing th e process which takes place when understanding occurs?"50 
This sentence only makes sense to someone who conceives und ers tand-
ing in terms of the rules of grammar and is not in danger of slipping back 
into th e sort of mentalism that was discarded in the reading of § §1-13. An 
uninitiated reader cannot simply clive into a middl e section and "follow th e 
argument." This is not beca use th e argument is untenable or unclea r, but 
because participation requires a reader of a certain sort-one who has been 
accl imated to the di scussion by the entire sequence of discuss ion which pre-
cedes a given sec tion . 
The pedagogical style of the Philoso{Jhical Grammar makes i~y de- __ 
man ding reading. Its structure is ~m:s;hi cal rather than logical: numbered 
- paragraphs are rungs of a ladder scaling a section; sections are rungs on a 
ladder scaling a part; and each part is a rung on a ladder which scales the 
whole. The ladder metaphor is, of course, borrowed from th e Tractatus. 
However, in the Tractatus the point of the metaphor was to urge readers to 
discard the ladder once a certain conceptual eleva tion had been atta ined, 
namely, a God's-eye view (sub specie aetemitatis). In contrast, here the point 
is in the cl imbing. 
Climbing is strenuous, and one ge ts the feeling that Wittgenstein ex-
pected as much from his reader as he did from those live bodi es who strug-
gled along during hi s half-clay lectures. One of his students reminisced: 
Usually at the beginning of the year Wittgenstein would warn us that 
we would find his lectures unsa ti sfactory, that he would go on talking 
like thi s for hours and hours and we would get very littl e out of it. 
Plainly he was sensitive to th e sort of audience he had . He wan ted a 
small group of people who, knowing what was in store for them, were 
prepared to put in a full strenuous year with him learning philosophy. 
Visitors, even distinguished visitors, who wan ted to attend a few lectures 
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to "find out what sort of thing Wittgenstein is doing" were not welcome, 
but anyone was welcome who se ri ously wa nted to lea rn [to do] fJhi -
losofJhy (and not just to hea r Wittgenstcin). And, if we worked hard , 
Wi ttgenstei n worked tremendously hard. 51 
Wittgenstein 's emerging pedagogica l style displayed in th e Big Type-
script betrayed the fact that he had shifted his attention in philosophy from 
striving after a view of the world sub specie aetemitatis to striving after an 
alteration of the sensibilities of concrete human beings . 
So far, I have tri ed to show that th e movement of th e subject from th e 
periph ery to the center of Wittgenstein 's philosophical vision is shown ini-
tially by tensions internal to th e 1922 publication, the Tractatus, and more 
fully in his experimentation with pedagogica l styl e after 1929. The shift- in 
style shows th at th e point of doing philosophy had changed for Wittgen-
stein: "A present-day teac her of philosophy doesn't select food for his pupil 
..:::-with tlie aim of flattering his tas te but with the aim of changing it."52 The 
goal of doing philosophy is not to produce a literary artifac t repl ete with 
timeless truths butto clea r u12 confusions in others' mi11d . In 1933 he wrote 
• 'bi'"philosophy ought to be written only as_poetic composition."53 Although 
Wittgenstein was never sati sfi ed that his work ever attained this level of 
arti stry, neverth eless, his work docs make th e same sorts of demands on a 
reader that proper reading of poetry does. Readers have to approach his writ-
ings deliberately and creatively, with th e commitment to inves t time and 
attention to nuance and subtle detail. At tim es one's investment seems fruit-
less. But as Wittgenstein once commented to Drury, "Philosophy is like try-
ing to open a safe with a combination lock. Each littl e adjustm ent of th e 
many dials seems to achieve nothing, only when all is in place does the door 
open." 54 
Evid ently Wittgenstein felt justifi ed in placing large demands on his 
would-be students precisely beca use of th e way he came to conceive phi-
losophy. Students during th e Michaelmas 'l crm 1930 quoted Wittgenstein 
as saying: "The nimbus of philosoph y has been los t. For now we have a 
method of doing phil osophy, and can speak of skillful philosoph ers."55 
WiLtgenstein did not have a philosophical th eory. Rath er, he proposed a 
method by which conceptual confusions in the minds of concrete subjects 
might be di ssolved . Philosophy becomes, in short, a kind of conceptual 
uth erapy."56 -- -- --
- wittgenstein felt that he had reached a "re<l l res ting place" in his con-
ception of philosophy as th erapy. 57 When philosophy is deemed "good," th e 
term is not a stamp of approval on a book's argument but an adj ec ti ve that 
--
1 
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praises the ski ll of the therapist who helps others clarify their cloudy think-
ing. However, Wi ttgenstein grew uneasy with the textbook feel of these first 
attempts at therapeutic philosophy. What emerges in Wittgenstein's most 
mature works might be ca lled aporetic philosofJhy. In th ese works we see 
Wittgenstein's true genius displayed. Rather than crea ting more textbooks 
to serve as self-help manuals for students beset by a particular set of confu-
sions, in th e later works Wiltgenstein reproduced conversa tions he had hcid-
with himself that, because of their aporetic character, engage reader who 
uffer from a wi de range of befudcllements. 
CHANGING THE SUBJECT 
The development of Wittgcnstein's later thinking is partially obscured by 
th e nature of his posthumously published works. In nea rly every case, each 
volume was originally conceived as notes for lec tures given during his 
tenure at Cambridge. The trouble with lecture note , of course, is that as 
the years pass a teacher is constantly having to begin at the beginning with 
a new, whi ch is to say uninitiated, batch of pupils. For this reason, any 
progress Wittgenstein himself made in crack ing problems th at were as 
"hard as granite" would be lost on new students until th ey had first worked 
through easy problems en route to grappling with the more difficult ones. 58 
Of course, there can never be enough time in the course of even a bright 
student's tenure to ca tch up with th e I ikes of Wi ttgenstein. Beca use of this 
distance, th e lec tures, even those he clictatecl, were for Wittgenstein th e 
pedagogica l equivalents of middle axioms, comments that were tailored to 
nudge a particular group of students along but for whom th e step to con-
ceptual clarity was too great to be made all at once. Therefore, these com-
ments may be at times poor refl ec tions of Wittgenstein 's own thoughts. We 
are thus amiss to read th e Blue and Brown Books, or th e Lectures 6 Con-
versations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief as transcriptions 
of Wittgenstein's mature thinking. As he explained to Russell, he di ctated 
th e notes known as th e Blue and Brown Booles so that his students, not the 
rest of th e worlcl ;s readers, would have something to take hom e in th eir .. 
• hands. 59 In fact, Drury reports that Wittgenstein fea red that student notes 
migh t be published as a record of his considered opinions (such as was clone 
in th e case of Lectures 6 Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Reli-
gious Belief) 60 
I am not sugges ting that Wittgenstein thought that publishing a philo-
sophical book was imposs ibl . Rath er, he thought that it must be a work of 
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genius. Only S S1-188 of the Philosophical Investigations came close to meet-
ing Wittgenstcin 's own rigorous stanclards61 The eli tinguishing mark of th e 
Investigations is its genre. Gone is the severe architectonic of the Tractatu.s 
and in its place is a string of numbered paragraphs that cannot even be sum-
marized by a table of contents (as per Philosophical Grammar). The invisi-
bili ty of an expli cit organizing principle and th e apparent lack of themati c 
unity give the Investigations the appearance of randomnc?s-as if each peri-
cope were a sta nd-alone ap11ori sm or thought-for-the-day journal entry. 
However, Wittgenstein deliberately crafted th e Investigations and regretted 
that its style in particular had become for him a source of vanity62 What was 
this style and why was it bri lliant? 
First, in a manner far more expli cit than that found in th e Tractatu.s, 
Wittgenstein 's later style displays the narrative, or autobiographical, unity 
of th e work. When Wittgenstein compil ed the Investigations from his jour-
nal entries, he took great pains to prese rve the diary-like quality of the tex t. 
He knew that his notebooks were not simply a compendium of isolated 
proverbs. Rather, his entries were th e unifi ed expression of hi s own story, 
hi s own "journ ey" to conceptual clarity; th ey were, so to speak, his own 
Confessions. 
~ ....,Wittgenstcil.l was quite taken by Augustine's Confessions. Drury reported 
/ u1at he kn ew hts way around th e Latm text well enough to find favonte 
passages qui ckly. 63 Even the casual reader must acknowledge that the Con-
fessions is not a theological trea ti se but an autob iograph ical acco unt of 
th e path taken by one who came to be "made gentl e by [God's:l books" and 
whose "wounds had been treated by [God's 1 soothing fingers."64 But whereas 
Augustine's Confessions are retrospective musings after th e fact of his char-
acter transformation , the Investigations is a record of conversa tions Wittgcn-
stein had with himself in th e course of his struggle to~a rcl character/ 
transformation. On ly the transformation of charac ter read1 ed one fo r th e 
sea rch for truth, because character alone was th e lens that could conce n-
trate whatever light was ava ilable into a single "burning point."65 Wittgen-
stein viewed character as the courageous and self-denying manner in wh ich 
a person fa ced truth wit:1 practi ced regularity: 
No one can speak the tuuth ; if he has still not mastered himself. He 
cannot speak it;-but not beca use he is not clever enough yet. 
The truth can be spoken only by someon e who is already at home 
in it; not by someone who still lives in falsehood and reac hes out from 
falsehood towards truth on just one occasion.66 
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T he quest for charac ter, th erefore, was fo r Wittgenstein a pass ionate 
ques t fo r a certain kind of life. Quoting Lessing with grea t emphasis, 
1ttgenstein remarked to Drury~ 
If God held closed in his right hand All truth , and in his left the single 
and untiring striving after truth , adding even that I always and forever 
make mistakes, and said to me: Choose!", I should fa ll humbly before 
his left hand and say: "Fa th er grant me! the pure truth is for you 
alone."67 
Wi ttgenstein acknowledged the unending nature of his struggle wh en he 
ad mitted that "My thinking, like everyone's, has sti cking to it the shrivel ed 
remains of my ea rli er (withered) ideas ."68 The fac t that Wittgenstein was 
aware of hi s own conceptual transformati on, one whi ch was both pro-
~g ressive and ye t ever in complete, gives th e J;1vestigations an open-ended 
texture. As we shall see, the Investigations was more than simply autobio-
graphical. Clearly, the sense of progress one ge ts by moving from page to 
page through the text is not a property of the text qua text, as if the Investi-
gations were organized topically or logically or chronologicall y. But it is also 
more than a record of Wittgenstein 's journey. Rath er, th e sense of progress 
involves the self-awareness that l, as a reader, am also having my way of see-
ing re-tooled and thus I am coming to conceive th e world differentl y; th e 
progress is my own conceptual transform ation . Only to the extent that th e 
Investigations maps out my journey will I be able to see its narrative unity. 
Second, Wittgenstein 's st rle is ex )li citly dialogical. Jane Heal argues ) 
that if the typi cal aim of philosophy is to construct firm er positions on life's < 
most imporbm t questions by means of di scursive rationality, then Wittgen-
stcin 's choice of a dialogical genre is self-defeating69 lt has been sugges ted 
that Wittgenstein 's deliberate obscurity was intended to overturn "philoso-
phy as di scursive reasoning" in favor of insight ga ined some other way (per-
haps by means of poe lly or mysti cism).70 As we have seen, there is more than 
a hint of this strategy in the Tractatus. But Heal rightly notes that this al-
ternative simply se ts up a dichotomy between insight ga in ed di scursively 
and insight ga ined in other ways. In fac t, th e later Wittgenstein is chal-
lenging this dichotomy altogether; clarity in thinking is achieved not by a 
pass ive fl ash of insight (whatever that might mea n), but by ac tive partici-
pation of the human subject in both practi cal and theoreti cal activity.71 Heal 
concludes that 
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th e dialogical form is parti cul arly appropriate for Wittgenstcin not just 
because it is li vely and ge ts th e reader engaged but beca use of some-
thing about th e content of 'th e message' he is trying to ge t across, or, 
better, something about the nature of lh e state which is th e hoped-for 
upshot of an atten ti ve and sympath eti c rcading. 72 
fn oth er wo rds, it is of no use to discuss general types of insight when th e 
) only species of und erstanding is th at whi ch is possessed by thi or that 
) human subj ect under this or that se t of conditions. Wittgcnstcin is not try-
ing to construct a stand-alone argument in th e Investigations. Rath er, he is 
trying to cultivate a kill (conceptual clarily) in his readers. Whil e he be-
moans that he lacks th e sort of arti sti c genius that can coerce one to see a 
work of art in the right perspecti ve, his strategy is no less brilliant.73 He pa-
raclcs past th e readers a seemingly endl ess se ri es of paragraphs (whi ch, at 
bes t, bea r a family resemblance) and a battali on of 784 questions with only 
n o answers, 70 of whi ch are in tenti onally wrong!73 Although no text ca n 
guarantee that it will succeed in teaching its reader how to think rightly-
and surely th ere is a bewildering va ri ety of opinions as to what the later 
Wittgenstcin was up to- neverth eless, one thing is certain: th e attentive 
reader must struggle if he or she is to read Wittgenstcin rightly. 
The point of philosophy for Wittgenstcin , then, is not th e conclusion 
t_?f an argument, but the struggle itself. As Stanl ey Cavell aptly quips, 
[Wittgenstein's] philosophy is interes ted in questions in its own way -
call it a way in whi ch th e answer is not in th e future but in th e way 
the future is approac hed, or seen to be unapproac habl e; in which th e 
journey to th e answer, or path , or tread, or th e trad es for it, are th e goal 
of it. 75 
l-Iene e, while th ere are scattered and inconsistent marks of an inter-
locutor(s) in Wittgenstein 's "dialogue," th e true interlocutor of th e Investi-
gations is th e reader whom Wittgenstein seeks to engage in life-b·ansforming 
struggle. 
This, then, shows the second way Wittgenstein 's later-period writings 
express th e centrali ty of th e human subj ect for his philosophy.76 Not only 
does his styl e admit to possess ing a "narrati ve unity"; by empl oying aver-
sion of dialogue, Wittgcnstein se ts before his reader an obstacle course th e 
purpose of which is to reconfigure his reader's way of seeing77 1'his way of 
putting things makes Wittgenstein out to be more of a moral sage than an 
analyti c philosopher. 78 Th ere is some credibility to this charge because, in 
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addition to being autobiographical and dialogical, Wittgenstein 's style of 
- philosophy is, third, deliberately therapeutic. 
Paul Engelmann, an architect by trade but, perhaps, one whose greater 
cla im to fame was to have been numbered by Wittgenstein among the few 
wh o truly understood th e Tractatus, notes in his memoirs the grea t simi-
lenity between Wittgenstein and the tu rn-of-th e-century Viennese jour-
nalist Ka rl Kraus. Kraus insisted that th e moral character of th e artist was 
e scn tial to his or her craftsmanship. When a defect was evident in an arti st's 
work, that defect ought to be understood as a manifes tation of a moral de-
fec t in th e artist's charac ter. Kraus furth er main ta ined that this happens 
nowhere more frequently than when the artisti c medium is that oflanguage'>t 
According to Engelmann, Kraus's claim that "I cannot get myself to accept 
that a whole sentence can ever come from half a man" shows that "Kraus 
adopts the only attitude that makes sense by judging th e morality not of an 
individual act, but of th e person ac ting, and it is th e latter whi ch is unerr-
ingly revealed to Kraus th rough language."79 Kraus's primary concern was 
to "preserve the puri ty of a language born of crea ti ve poe tical experience."80 
That Wittgenstein shared Kraus's views concerning the relation of the 
artist's character to th e quality of his or her work is evidenced by his com-
ment published as the fo reword to Philosophical Remarks: 
I would like to say "This book is written to the glory of God," but nowa-
days that would be chi ca nery, that is, it would not be rightly under-
stood. It mea ns that the book is written in good will , and in so far as it 
is not so written, but out of va ni ty, etc., the author would wish to ee it 
condemned. He cannot free it of these imfntrities further than he him-
self is free of them. 81 
ittgenstein intentionally poured his life into his writing. His writings were ~ 
not simply an acc idental refl ec tion ofWiltgenstein's character. They were 
th e product of a certain kind of devotion, perhaps even religious devotion 82 
T hat Wittgenstein considered his book a needing to be purged of its 
impuriti es in order to be a fittin g oblation was but an indication that he 
rega rded himself as requi ring purifi ca ti on. Although Wittgenstein was 
powe rless to take his book furth er than he himself had gone, he had come 
this far. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein sought to protect language from the 
meddl esome hands of metaphysicians, logical positivists, and others who 
attempt to specify things that can only be shown. Wittgenstein 's original 
project, as I read th e Tractatus, was to circumvent defec tive use oflanguage 
by showing th e limits beyond which philosophical language cannot tread. 
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But his "revolution" consisted in this: From th e Blue Boo!~ on Wittgenstei n 
did not simply seck to prevent the express ion of a speaker's moral defec ts 
in his or her usc of language but sought rath er to cure th e moral defec t it-
self, that is to say, to transform the speaker's charac ter by engaging him or 
her in a struggle for conceptual clarity. Here "conceptual clarity" is not 
simply a cogn itive state (For cognitively impaired people ca n develop char-
acter) but additionally involves adopting the right sort of stance (o r "good j 
will") toward th e world-for exa mple, th e courageous surrender of one's 
craving for explana tion or of one's craving to say what can only be shown -
the progressive attainment of which stance cons titutes one's character. 
Perhaps now we arc in a pos ition to see the way in wh ich "th e cen-
trality of th e subject" in W ittgenstei1 'slater work determined th e similarity 
h e saw among ethi cs, aesthetics, andphilosophy. In tl1 c T'wctatus 6.421 
Wittgenstein wrote: "E thi cs and aesthetics are one." This amb iguou 
claim is open to several lin es of interpretation . First, a common turn-of-
th e-century reading assum ed that ethi cs, religion, and aesthetics shared th e 
common fate of being literally meaningless . A strict th eory of representa-
tionalism delineated between those statements that could be empirically 
verified and those statements (not only ethical, rei igious, and ac the ti c state-
ments, but "countless" kinds of statements, as Wittgcnstcin would wryly ob-
serve later) whose only poss ibl e significance was assumed, by default, to 
1 ic in their function as express ions of human value, experi ence, or emotion. 
In this view, all such "pseudo-propositions" were unified by not being about 
anything at alJ.S' 
If the first way to read th e enigmatic "E thics and aesthetics are one" is 
to consign both to the fate of being about nothing, a second way to read this 
statement is to understand ethics and aesthetics as sharing equally multi-
farious origins. This is the tack taken by D. Z. Phillips in his essays collected 
under th e title Inten1entions in Ethics 8 4 Wh il e aesthetic taste can, to some 
degree, be schooled, ultimately words such as "beauty" name a family re-
semblance that defi es general trea tment. The same holds For judgments of 
ethical value. The real danger, warns Phillips, is th e distortion that ar ises 
when we succumb to our crav ing for generality and try to subsume ethics 
(or aesthetic ) under a general theoretical fram ework. Moral (and aesthetic) 
judgment can be schooled, but since each instance of moral education pre-
supposes a correlative communal form of life, aspiring to trans-communal 
(or, in Phi llips's case, acommunal ) moral judgment would be pointless. If 
the real danger for ethi cs and aesthe ti cs li es in the distortion that a unifying 
theory brings to incommensurable value judgments, th en the philosopher 
J 
-
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is obliged to perform interven tions to thwart th eoretics and leave everything 
as it i .85 
But there is a third way of understanding th e unity of ethi cs and aes-
theti cs that is more in line with Wiltgenstein's emphasis on changing human 
subjec ts. Benjamin Tilghman links th e meaning of th e Tracta rian maxim 
to th e broader context of th e T'ractatus and shows that. ethi cs and aesthet-
JCS are unified by a joint concer.n.lor th e truly important in human life. 
Since th e realm of value ca nnot be spoken, but must be shown , Ti lgh-
man speculates that for Wiltgenstcin only through art can th ese va lues be 
shown. This is poss ibl e beca use art expresses th e human spirit in th e 
sa me way that my world is an express ion of my spirit when I view it sub 
species aetemitatis. 86 
As described above, Wittgenstcin abandoned th e hope of viewing th e 
world from a God's-eye view (sub s{J ecie aetemitatis), but reta ined the view 
that contemplating th e interconnectedness and limited character of the 
wm·ld was of utmost ethical importance. The upshot of this line of reason-
ing is that the morally good life is one lived in agreement or cooperation 
with th ese limits. Art celebrates our ability to see rightly, or in th e right per-
spec ti ve, by showing al l the connections of an object with its surroundings . 
Conversely, grasping a work of art is much like contemplating a world in 
miniature: 
The work of art shows us th e essence; it shows us the object in its nec-
essary connections with other things and it shows th e scene portrayed 
as the logically necessa ry unily of the various artistic elements that com-
pose it. And it is tempting to beli eve that this is part of what it means 
to see the ob ject in right perspec tive.87 
And perhaps this is what Wittgenstein meant by saying, "a work of art forces 
us-as one might say- to see it in the right perspcctive."88 Beca use a work1' 
of art manifests all the connection of an object with its con text, it is, in 
one sense, a self-contained world. But in contrast to a work of art, whose 
hermeneutic key is internal to the work itself, life strikes us as an unsolvable 
riddl e. Tilghman argues that Wittgcnstein used this comparison of art (aes-
th etics) and life (e thics) to display the point that there is no riddle for us to 
solve.89 The real problem is the how, not the why, of living. Consequently, 
on Tilghman's view, to li ve rightly is to look at the world rightly, which is to 
say, under an aspect that di ssolves th e "riddle." Tilghman describes Witt-
genstein as seeing ethics and aesthetics internally related to the character 
l 
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of th e human subj ec t, because both require judgments that are express ions 
of character: 
A person's vi ew of the world and tha t person 's character a re intimately \ 
intertwined; they are, to all purposes, one. A person's view of the world 
determines his character; his charac ter and hence his view of the world , 
is revealed in his deeds. T h e important thing is not so mu ch what is 
done, but how it is done and the spirit with which it is done. W ith out 
thi s link of charac ter, spirit and vision to action th ere can be no eth ics 
and no moral assessment of a dccd 90 
Th is is a good desc ription as far as it goes. However, T ilghman misses 
the social charac ter of ethical and aes th eti c judgm ent. Wittgenstein is quite 
explicit on thi s poin t. In his Lectu.res 6 Conversations he (reportedl y) said , 
"In order to ge t clear on aes th eti c words you have to describe ways of liv-
ing."91 I contend that Wi ttgenstcin maintained th roughout his life that th e 
unity of ethics, aestheti cs, and religion was a uni ty derived from the fac t that 
all rely on the same sort of skill s upon whi ch th e social medium ofl anguage 
depends. 
Certainly by 1933 Wittgenstein had come to think of aesth eti cs as de-
sc riptive. "All that Aestheti cs docs is 'to draw your attention to a thing', to 
'place things side by side' ."92 Here the connections manifested by a work 
"-.of art are such that to see it ri ghtly means seeing its connections with life-
though not connec tions with th e artist's inner life only, but with th e history, 
context, culture, and conventi ons of artisti c practi ce as well. H owever, th e 
person who has come to grasp these connec ti ons cannot be sa id to have a 
handl e on the causal connections as if he or she possessed an answer for 
what makes something beautiful. Rather, those who grasp th e connections 
between a work of art and its broade r context can be sa id to have developed 
a sort of flu ency in th e language of th e craft. T hus, Wittgenstcin views the 
apprehension of a compositi on 's "n1eaning" as a tra ined capacity or skill. 
For example, 
The direc tion: "Wie a us weiter Ferne" in Schumann . M ust everyone 
understand such a direction ? Everyone, fo r example, who would un-
derstand the direc tion "Not too qui ck?" Isn ' t th e capac ity that is sup-
posed to be absent in the m eaning-blind man one of this kind?93 
W ittgenstein's point is that only the skillful are able to rightl y judge what 
Schumann m eant by "playing a piece as if from afar" or wh en the tempo 
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is "not too qui ck." Such a skill , or Auency, is developed by a certa in sort of 
training9 4 "You can make a person see what Brahms was driving at by show-
ing hi m lots of diffe rent pieces by Brahms, or by comparing hi m with a con-
temporary author."95 In oth er words, induction into the prac ti ce can tune 
one's ea rs to the language of music. 
Suppose you hea r a piece of music in which you judge th e bass to be 
"too heavy." In making such a judgment, Wiltgenstein observed that "what 
we are trying to do is to bring the bass 'nearer to an ideal', though we haven't 
an ideal before us whi ch we arc trying to copy."96 Judgments of"beauty" are 
not straightfo rward proced ures as one might check th e spelling of words on 
this page by looking up eac h word in a dictionary. Rather, aes thetic judg-tr"l 
ments arc express ions of sl?ill. This is not to say that bea uty in art is simply 
an express ion of solitary human prefere nce, for judgments are shared: 
agreement in judgment of beauty is one pccics of th e reAexive sort of agree-
ment upon which language depcnds 97 Wittgenstein would later comment: 
There is a lot to be learned from Tolstoy's bad th eorizing about how a 
work of art conveys 'a feeling' .- You really could call it, not exac tly th e 
express ion of a feeling [i.e., the arti st's emotional state], but at least an 
express ion of feeling or a felt express ion . And you could say that in o 
far as people understand it, th ey 'resonate' in harmony with it, respond 
to it. You might say: the work of art does not aim to convey something 
else [e.g., the arti t:'s psychological state], just itself.98 
Wittgenstcin ca lls this an expression of "feeling" rather than of "a feeling" 
prec isely because it is shared. Nevertheless, it is not feeling in general. 
Rather, art is conventional in nature and expresses the acc idental form of 
a particular culture's life. We might say that for Wittgenstein , aesthetics is 
neither universal nor individual is ti c, but ethnocentric. G. E. Moore recalled 
Wittgenstein's words: 
He sa id that such a statement as "That bass moves too much" is not a 
statement about human beings at all, but is more like a piece of mathe-
mati cs; and th at, if I say of a face wh ich I draw "It smiles too much," 
thi s says th at it co uld be brought close r to some "ideal" ... and 
th at .. . would be more like "solving a math emati cal problem."99 
Aes th eti cs and eth ics are judgments of value, but such a value is neither a 
self-subsistent ideal, nor the properly of th e lone individual, nor a general 
fea ture of humans qua humans. Rather, the values that aesthetic and ethical 
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judgments expose are those shared by a communi ty. In an important sense, 
these values (or at least, agreement in judgments of them) is what makes a 
group a communi ty. This being the case, there is only a nominal difference 
between skillful aesthetic and ethical judgment and skillful participation in 
oth er social-conventional practices (such as mathematics and language), 
which together constitute membership in community. This way of viewing 
things shifts the focus of aesthetics (or ethics) from the values expressed by 
an artifact (or in an instance of moral reasoning) to the question of whether 
one has th e skill deemed adequate for rendering judgmen ts th at stand in 
agreement wi th those of th e community. 
It is no secret that Wittgenstein con idered mathematics to be about an 
agreement in judgments. In the late 1930s Wittgenstein described his brand 
of mathemati cal constructivism with th ese words: "a mathematician is al-
ways inventing new forms of description . Some, stimul ated by practical 
needs, another from aesthetic needs,-and yet others in a va riety of ways." 
This makes th e mathematician out to be more of an inventor than a di s-
coverer.1 00 The mathema tician is not a discoverer, since, on Wittgenstein's 
view, there is no uncharted wild erness ("out the1e") to explore. Similar 
claims could be made for ethics, aesthetics, and ph il osophy. Wittgenstein 
distanced himself from the common notion that ethicists, artists, and ph i-
losophers are pioneer into previously uninhabited metaphysical jungles. 
Ethi cal, aesthetic, and ph ilosophical puzzlement are not instances of some-
one being lost or of something being hidden. Rather, puzzlement points 
to a deficiency in human skill to see what is already before one as the solu-
tion itself. In a parenthetical remark, Wittgenstein stated: 
Here we stumble on a remarkable characteristi c phenomenon in ph ilo-
sophical investiga tion : the difficulty- I might say- isn't one of finding 
the solution; it is one of recognizing something as the solution. We have 
already sa id everything. Not something that fo llows from this; no, just 
this is the solution ! 
This, I believe, hangs together with our wrongly expecting an ex-
planation; whereas a description is the solution of th e diffi culty, if we 
give it the right place in our considera tion. If we dwell upon it and do 
not try to ge t beyond it. 101 
Accordingly, the task of philosophy is to cure human subj ects of philo-
sophical barbarism: "A present-clay teacher of philosophy doesn't select food 
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for his pupil with. the aim of fl attering his taste, but with the aim of chang-
ing it."I 02 
T he goal of cul tivating good taste-a goal which makes the human 
subj ect the centerpi ece of the ph ilosophical task - mea nt that Wittgen-
stein 's approach in philosophy resembled training in art appreciati on. 
Moore paraphrases: 
He went on to say that, th ough philosophy had now been "reduced to 
a matter of sk ill ," ye t this sk ill , like other skill s, is very difficult to ac-
quire. One difficulty was that it required a "sort of thinking" to whi ch 
we are not accustomed and to which we have not been trained-a sort 
of thinking ve ry different from what is required in th e sciences . And he 
sa id that the required skill could not be acquired by merely hearing the 
lectures : di sc uss ion was essential. As regards his own work, he sa id it 
did not matter wheth er his results [concerning some particular gram-
matical investigation] were true or not: what mattered was that "a 
method had been found." 101 
No fine arts instructor ca n discursively prove th e grea tness of, say, Rem-
brandt's "The Return of th e Prodigal Son." Rather, an instructor shows th e 
students the painting itself and supplements this showing with descriptions 
that frame the painting in a family of other similar paintings and within the 
historical practice itself. This descriptive pedagogy at once leaves everything 
as it is and yet forever alters the students' way of seeing (even if this alter-
ation goes no deeper th an that th e student th ereafter takes Rembrandt as 
one benchmark for "good" art). 
A reader of Wittgenstein 's playful examples oflanguage-ga mes faces a 
similar opportunity. In order to grasp what Wittgenstein was up to in the 
opening pages of Investigations, th e reader must, provisionally at least, come r \ 
, to conceive of meaning (e.g., of "Slab! ") as use (i. e., the builder's request) 
within a given form of life (namely, the construction of a building) . But to 
think this way requires th e student to suspend both th e craving for a gen-
eral definition and th e presuppositi on that general definitions cover all the 
cases. To learn, even imaginatively, the moves internal to Wittgcnstein's ini-
ti al (and simpl ifi ed) exampl e of a language-game constitutes a notion of un-
derstanding-as-mastery. Furth ermore, this example of a language-game is 
followed by many others, each of which is but a single rung on the internal 
ladder that constitutes the Investigations. In surmounting each rung, progres 
can be made; Wiltgenstein hopes that readers who scale the book will, at the 
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book's end, have com e to view things so differently that th ey effec tively have 
kicked away th e ladder. Readers who have atta ined tha t level of sk ill and 
clarity and who look back at the ea rli e r pedagogical exampl es will immedi-
ately discern these examples to be confused, sim p! is tic, or shallow. 
T he sort of progress W ittgenstein hopes fo r hi readers lends irony to 
th e complaint that Rush Rhees voiced in his essay "Wittgenstein 's Builders." 
Rh ees wondered ifWiltgenstein 's gam es analogy was too simplisti c an ac-
count of what it means to speak. Speaki ng requires m ore than constru ct-
ing grammatically correc t sentences; it involves hav ing something to say 
whi ch "bears on" th e res t of th e conve rsa ti on. Rh ees charged tha t if th e 
builders' language-game was imagined a a language comple te in itself, as 
Wittgenstein enj oin ed us to do, th en th e builders would resemble puppets 
more than human beings . Wouldn 't th e buil de rs talk about what the build-
ing was for, once th e work day was over? Wouldn' t they di scuss at home 
snags encountered on th e jobsite? Wouldn 't th ey require entirely different 
language-games for teaching th eir children? And so on. Rh ees concluded 
that Wiltgenstein 's analogy did not answer what it i to have a language be-
cause it fail ed to show how language is related to th e rest of human living . 
. . . if [the builders] speak to one anoth er, the m eaning of th e expres-
sion they use cannot lie wholly in the use or the reaction that it receives 
in thi s job . . . . But th e remarks th ey make may have something to do 
with one another; otherwise they are not talking at all , even th ough they 
may be utteri ng sentences. And th eir rem arks could have no bearing 
on on e anoth er unless th e express ions th ey used were used in oth er 
connections as well . 104 
Wh at sort of conclusion can this be? A better question is, What sort of 
person is drawing thi s con clusion ? Until his recent dea th , Rh ees was one of 
W ittgenstein's literary exec utors, not to mention a close personal fri end and 
long-time student. We find in Rhees, therefore, one who has worked his way 
around the Wiltgensteinjan corpus many times and in many ways . In short, 
he is one who has lea rned to "go on." However, Rhees seems curiously un-
aware that his own ma ture facility was his teacher's intention for him all 
along. In S §1- 188 of the Investigations (whi ch stands out forb ing th e only 
section of Wittgenstein 's writings with whi ch Wittgenstcin was sati sfi ed), 
the provisional character of th e exercises is evident throughout. On the one 
hand , Wittgenste in construc ts expli c it permuta ti ons of th e o ri ginal lan-
guage-gam e of th e builders (cf. Sz with S8) . O n th e oth er hand , Wiltgen-
stein also explicitly expands on the method expressed in language-game Sz 
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(as in S48). Both kinds of development manifest Wittgcnstein's intention to ~ 
lead his readers on a conceptual journey rather than express once and for 
all by a single exampl e all that it means to speak. That his goal was for the 
reader to transcend the opening positions of the Investigations' master game 
is made explicit in th e last reference to language-games in this section: 
S179 Let us return to our case (151). It is clear that we should not say B 
had the right to say the words "Now I know how to go on," just because 
he thought of the formula .... And now one might think that th e sen-
tence "I can go on" mea nt I have an experience which I know empiri-
ca ll y to lead to th e continuation of the seri es." But does B mean that 
when he says he can go on? ... 
No. The words "Now I can go on" were correctly used when he 
thought of th e formul a: that is, given the circumstance as that he had 
lea rnt algebra, had used such formula before.- But that does not mean 
that his statement is only short for a description of all the circumstances 
which constitutes the scene for our language-game.- Think how we learn 
to use the expressions "Now I know how to go on," "Now I can go on" and 
others; in what family of language-games we learn their use. 105 
When juxtaposed with Wiltgenstein's set of reader instructions, it is evident 
that Rh ces's charge is bes ide th e point for two important reasons. First, 
Wiltgenstein 's account of language-games in S179 does achi eve th e nuance 
that Rh ees sought after; unlike language-game (S z) , Wittgenstein here) 
clea rl y linked the intelligibilily oflanguage-games with th e circumstances 
and scenery of the rest of life. Second, this pericope also shows Wittgen-
stcin 's sense of "understanding" as an instance of mastery ("going on") by 
the explicit command to the reader ("Think . . . ") to finish th e string of ex-
ercises (whi ch Wittgenstein painstak ingly laid out for the reader over the 
course of these seventy-two pages of text) by going beyond th e final position 
of the text. This Rhees has clone. 
Rh ees's objection fa lls short in assum ing that Wiltgenstein 's concept of 
"language-game" holds steady throughout the Investigations. The fact that 
he ven makes the charge he does, given Rhees's own level of skill , cor-
robora tes th e claim that Wittgenstein's philosophical method , as embodied 
in the Investigations, trea ts ethics and aes thetics as unified in the linguis tic~ 
sk ill of ac tual persons. This unity is one which makes the transformation 
of th e human subj ect the very heart of th e philosophical task. 
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